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SUMMARY 
With the advent of mlcroprocessor technology, it has hecoae possible to 
automate many of the functions on the flight deck of commercial aircrafi that 
were prevlously performed eanually. However, it is not clear whether these 
functions should be automated, takins into consideration various human factors 
issues. 
A NASA-industry workshop was held to identify the human factors issues 
related to flight-deck automation whiph would require research far resolution. 
The scope of automation, the benefits of automation, and automation-induced 
problems were discussed, and a list of potential research topics was generated 
by the participants. 
This report summarizes the workshop dlseussions presents the questions 
developed at that time. 
Earl L. Wiener is with the Departments of Management Science and Industrial 
Engineering, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida 33124. He is a visit- 
Inu  research scientist at Arne3 Research Center under an Intergovernmental Per- 
sonnel Agreement. 
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Hodern mlcrop~ocessor teobnology and display syateem make it possible to  
automate mamy of the Punotione 011 the fl i&t d w k  of coamercfrl a i r l i n e s  t h a t  
were previouly performed manually. In h o t ,  the question today I s  n o t  wfieth- 
er a Furrction can be automated, bu t  rather should it be automated, t a k i n g  into 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  varioua huatan fact= issues. Alt-h the re  are mimy real bene- 
fits to  be d e r i v e d  f’rom automation, f t  888818 highly q u e s t i o n a b l e  whether total  
system safe ty  I s  always enhanced by a l l o c a t t n q  f u n c t i o n s  to  au tomat i c  d e v i c e s  
rather t h a n  S u e .  operators. For a f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s t o n  af these issues, see 
r e f e r e n c e s  1 - 5. 
A NASA-industry workshop w a s  held on July 17 and 18, 1980, in Burlingame, 
California to  d i s c u s s  these i s s u e s .  The workshop w a s  organ ized  by Renwick 
Curry,  Earl Ufener,  and Alan Chambers of t h e  Man-Vehicle Systems Research 
Divls ion of NASA, and admtn i s t e red  by Sc ience  and Human Values,  Inc.  The pri-  
mary o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  workshop was tc d e f i n e  t h e  important  research amas in- 
volved i n  the  huaran factors of f l i g h t d e c k  avtotsation and to create a list OP 
gene ra l  and specific research ques t ions .  
Workshop p a r t i c l p a n t s  (Appendix A )  were drawn fkom NASA, t h e  FAA, t h e  
RAF, a i r l t n e  companies, aircraft manufacturing companies, u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  and 
c o n s u l t i n g  firms. The p a r t i c i p a n t s  were chosen far t h e i r  exper t i s t?  i n  autocaa- 
t i o n  and human factors and their a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  des ign  of a 
research program in t h i s  area. The conference chair-? was Renwick Curry of 
Ames Research Center .  
The workshop comprised f o u r  major s e s s i o n s :  
Sess ion  1: Group meeting t o  in t roduce  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and d i s c u s s  t he  
basic human factors issues involved i n  f l i gh t -deck  automation. 
Sess ion  2: P a r a l l e l  croup meetinqs t o  g e n e r a t e  a list of i s s u e s  t h a t  re- 
quire research for r e s o l u t i o n .  This list was compiled i n  t h e  form of a set of 
general research ques t ions .  
Session 3: Group meetinq t o  d i s c u s s  r e sea rch  priorities. 
Sess ion  4: P a r a l l e l  ,qroup meetings t o  g e n e r a t e  a list of specific 
research issues wi th in  each gene ra l  researc;i a rea .  
T h i s  report summarizes t h e  research a r e a s  described by t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
and p r e s e n t s  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  developed du r ing  t h e  workshoo. 
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Prior to  t h e  workabop, the p a r t i c i p a n t s  were asked to oonstder t h r e e  
ques t ions :  (1) What I s  t he  saope of W s l u t m t i o n a  tn 300~. f ie ld  of interest? 
(2) Utmt b e n e f i t s  does autoerr t ion provide? and (3) What types of automatiarl- 
t n d d  p rob leea  do you know about? A t  the  begtnntng of tbe srorkshap, each 
p a r t i c i p a n t  was asked to address these q u e s t t s n s  b r t e f l y ,  aad eaoh 
participant's cosen#nts were followed by an open dtsouasiarr. ¶'he issues that 
arose as a r e s u l t  of t h i s  seeston are suemartzed hem. 
¶'he p a r t i e l p a n t s  g e n e r a l l y  agwd  that technology is now s u f f i c i e n t l y  ad- 
vanced 90 that it is t h e o r e t € c a l l y  possible to automate most s y s t e m .  Howgv- 
cr, ttme and cost c o n s t r a t n t s  o f t e n  impose p r a c t i c a l  Itoits on ' t h e  scope of 
a u t m t i o n .  For example, i n  a n  a c c i d e n t  i n r e s t i g a t i r m ,  saaeone with expe r t -  
enae u s u a l l y  m s  out to  collect t n f o m a t l o n  pro0 the  si te of t h e  a c c i d e n t  and 
to  t a l k  t o  t h e  people  concerned. Although it might be possible to  b u i l d  rn 
automated system to  ac-plish these t a s k s ,  such a system would probably be 
q u i t e  expensire t o  desim and use; i n  addi t ion ,  t h e  s o l c t i o n s  may not be a n  
improvement o v e r  those provided by a human e x p e r t .  On t h e  other hand, milo 
aut-ted systems such as au to land  have been developed and implemented on t h e  
f l i g h t  deck. 
The p r e w n c e  of humms i n  t h e  processinq loop  also i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  scope 
of automation. The a c t u a l  implementation of a system is l imi ted  by a pilot's 
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  engage t h e  system {where he has  a choice). Anecdotal reports 
frop f l i p h t  crews have ShOWi t h a t  p i l o t s  w h o  are no t  thoroughly f a m i l i a r  wi th  
a system, or who feel t h a t  t h e  system does no t  perform as t hey  would l € k e ,  
G i l l  n o t  u se  t h a t  system. For example, because cf passenKer coaaplainta about 
excess ive  movement of t h e  a l rcraf t ,  p i l o t s  rarely engage t h e  f u l l y  automatic  
VOR t r q c k i n g  mode of a u t o p l l o t s .  
Ptlots arc also unwillfnrt  t o  engage f u l l y  automatic svstems for  other 
reasons.  m e n  an a c t m a t e d  system such as au to l and  is enpaued, t h e  p i l o t  ts 
r e l c s a t e d  t o  t h e  role of a monitor ,  no t  a c o n t r o l l e r ,  and n o t  m l v  is t h i s  
less cha l l eng lnq  for t h e  pilot, bu t  I t  may lead to  a decretuent in t h e  p i l o t ' s  
a b i l i t y  t o  land t h e  a i r p l a n e  manually. 
The d r i v i n a  f o r c e s  for automation were considered t o  be mainly economic 
and safety Issues :  however, I t  w a s  pointed o u t  t h a t  a i r l i n e s  have allowed new 
features t o  be introduced i n t o  a i r c r a f t  simply because t h e  manufacturer in- 
cluded them in t h e  s t a n d a r d  v e r s i o n  of t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
Automatton appea r s  t o  provlde two t y p e s  of bene f i t s .  The first is t h a t  
automation allows c e r t a i n  f u n c t i o n s  t o  be oerformed t h a t  could n o t  be per- 
formed o the rwise ,  ei ther because humans are not  capable  of performint: t h e  
f h n a t i o n s ,  
performanee. For exwle ,  p i l o t s  are not allowed t o  land a i r p l a n e s  manually 
in Category I11 weather  oaadttiens; t h e y  may onlg land the  aircraft by engap- 
tng t h e  au to l and  system. 
or because of wst ,  time, or s a f e t y  ms t r a in t a  Imposed by mnwl ,', 
The seoond type of benefit d e r t v e s  from the  fact t h a t  automated systems 
arc+ o f t e n  a b l e  t o  p rov ide  a better solution to a problem t h a n  humans. These 
bcneftta are seen I n  many aspeots of f l y i n q .  P m  t h e  systems s t a n d p o i n t ,  au- 
tomted equipment may be superior to  human performance for r e a s o n s  o f  cost- 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  or cons i s t ency .  Prtm t h e  user s t a n d p o i n t ,  the 
b e n e f i t s  i n c l u d e  :he p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e  fol lowing:  decreased workload, an in- 
creased s a f e t y  mrgtn, Inoreased q u a l i t y  of Life for t he  CFBW and passengws, 
t h e  ease of l e a r n i n g  t o  operate t h e  system, speed and convenience in actual 
use ,  i nc reased  operating e f f i c i e n c y ,  and incPeased schedu le  dependab i l i t y .  
for example, i n c r e a s e d  passenger comfort and system opgrat inR e f f i c i e n c y  can 
be achteved by allowing a f l i g h t  management system to  compute a f l i g h t p a t h  
t ha t  avotds t u r b u l e n c e  w h i l e  a t  t h e  same time conse rv ing  f u e l .  
The p a r t i c i p a n t s  a l s o  referred to  s e v e r a l  possible f u t u r e  b e n e f i t s  of au- 
tomation. If automatton does decrease workload, c r e a t i n g  spare ti* on 
f l i q h t s ,  it might be p o s s i b l e  t o  use  t ha t  time p r o f i t a b l y  by prowiding for 
on-board t r a i n i n q .  More a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  design and u s e  of d i r p l a y s  may allow 
those d i s p l a y s  to  perform f u n c t i o n s  t ha t  they  c u r r e a t l y  do n o t  s e r v e ,  such RS 
servinq as e x t e r n a l  semry aids. Wovinq rnsp d i s p l a y s  could provide n o t  o n l y  a 
better r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  e x a c t  l o c a t i o n  of the  a i r p l a n e  a t  any atwen ttlne, 
b u t  a l s o  t o  remind t h e  p i l o t  t h a t  he  is f l y i n q  an a i r p l a n e ,  no t  j u s t  wetchine 
instruments .  
The problems cited by t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  included those tha t  have already 
been encountered,  as well as p o t e n t i a l  problem is t h e  f u t u r e .  
Ylolattons af m e r  ita - Problems are c r e a t e d  by automation whenever t h e  
automated sys tem does n o t  a c t u a l l y  provide t h e  bemfits t h a t  have been claimed 
f o r  it;  t h a t  is, there w i l l  be p rob leas  i f  t h e  au tomat i c  systeril is less reli- 
a b l e ,  more c o s t l y  t o  o p e r a t e ,  3r creates a h e a v i e r  workload than the manusl 
system it r e p l a c e s ,  or i f  i f  c r e a t e s  a dexeased safety m r R i n  or dilainished 
q u a l i t y  of l i fe .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  f e l t  t h a t  m s t  f i rz 'c-  
g e n e r a t i o n  automated equipment e x h i b i t s  a t  l e a s t  sone of these n e r a t i v a  
festures. The ground p r o x i a i t y  warninq sys tem (GPUS), f o r  examole, produced 
r m y  f a l s e  alarm when it w93 first introduced i n t o  t h e  cockpit. Blthnufh 
succeedinq qenerat . tons of equipment tend t o  correct i n i t i a l  problems (e.q., 
CPWS), such has  n o t  slways been t h e  case.  
ny,-- - The failure of automated equipment t o  func t ion  as expected 
ieadt t c  a problem of c r e d i b i l i t y .  If u s e r s  do n o t  trust a systea, t h e y  are 
not l i k e l y  t o  use it. C r e d i b i l i t y  ex tends  beyond a Qross w a s l i r e  of u s e  or 
nonuse, however. The limits t o  which a user t r u s t s  a system may vary as a 
func t ion  o f  pas t  system performance a? well as t h e  u s e r ' s  knowled,yQ o f  a Riven 
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syatemgs aocuraoy. If air traffio oontrollera are urnware t h a t  t h e i r  oonso le s  
are oapable of d i s p l a y l a g  Information that is sraeurate to w i t h i n  a few feet, 
t h e y  w i l l  not make a p p r o p r i a t e  use of the  in fo rma t ion  presented.  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand, people may determine locations on maps wi th  qreater care and accuracy  
t h a n  are warranted  by the o r i g i n a l  data from which t h e  map was drawn. 
- The development of a t r a i n i n g  program is d i f f i c u l t  where au- 
tomated equipment is involved  because  u s e r s  must be trained i n  two capacities: 
as monitors of t h e  system when it is t n  the  f u l l y  au tomat i c  W e ,  and IS con- 
trollers of t h e  system when it is i n  any o t h e r  mode. The s k t l l s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  i n  these two c a p a o i t t e s  are n o t  o n l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  b u t  o f t e n  i n  c o n f l i c t  
with one  another .  Controlling a sys tem m q u i r e s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  knowledge about 
t h e  systam, p r o f i c i e n c y  i n  t he  manual skills requ i red  t o  operate t h e  system, 
and f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  dealing wi th  t h e  system. The f l e x i b i l i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  that  are beneficial i n  d e a l t n g  wi'ch a manual system nay create 
problems i n  dealtng w i t h  an automated system. Conversely,  proloneed use  df a 
system i n  t h e  au tomat i c  mode say lead to  a d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of manual s k i l l s  and 
R loss of p r o f i c i e n c y ,  which may degrade performance on  a manual system. 
Given the  c o n f l i c t i n g  n a t u r e  of t h e  two f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  about  where t o  
p l a c e  priorities in t r a i n i n g  is d i f f i c u l t .  
I n  normal use ,  t h e  sys tem operates irr t h e  au tomat ic  mode and t h e  u s e r  
does n o t  need to call on special s k i l l s  (which are expens ive  t o  t r a i n ) .  The 
ques t ion  t h e n  becomes one  of cos t - e f f ec t iveness ;  t h a t  is, is t h e  time requ i r ed  
t o  t r a i n  u s e r s  t o  deal w i t h  these rare e v e n t s  worthwhile? The answer t o  t h i s  
q u e s t i o n  is compl ica ted  by t h e  fact t h a t  even af ter  an  i n i t i a l  investment  i n  a 
f u l l  t r a i n i n g  program, a n  operator's s k i l l s  may have deteriorated t o  a non- 
u s e f u l  level. by t h e  time any p a r t i c u l a r  emerqency arises t h a t  ca l l s  on those 
s k i l l s .  The r e s o l u t i o n  of t h l s  problem may u l t i m a t e l y  lie n o t  i n  cost- 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  bu t  i n  t h e  ques t ion  of l i a b i l i t y ;  t h a t  is, who is respons ib l c  
for an a c c i d e n t  caused by t h e  l l a l func t ion  of an  automated system. I n  av ia-  
t i o n ,  t h e  "commodityn a t  stake €s human l i fe ,  and t h e  cost associated w i t h  ad- 
d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  may be wcr thnhi le .  
The t a s k  of Cevis ing  an  adequate  t r a i n i n s  program is also hampered by t he  
mixture of o l d  and new equipment i n  cockpits.  Often,  p i l o t s  are t r a l n e d  on 
equipnent  t h a t  is from a d i f f e r e n t  gene ra t ion  (older or newer) t h a n  t h e  equip- 
ment An example was g iven  a t  t h e  workshob of a 
mi l i t a ry  officer who r ece ived  e x t e n s i v e  t r a i n i n g  on a f o u r t h  gene ra t ion  COR- 
sole. m e n  he  reported -or du ty ,  he was confronted  w i t h  a first s e n e r a t i o n  
piece of equlpment. He sat  there and looked a t  it for a whi le  and said "Oh, 1 
remember t h a t .  In t h e  museum a t  t h e  school they  had tha t  locked UP i n  a 
C X E . ~  T h i s  problem is no t  restricted t o  new p i l o t s ;  a s i m i l a r  problem c?ccurz 
when p i l o t s  t r a n s f e r  from one t y p e  of a i rcraf t  t o  another .  
t h e y  a c t u a l l y  use on t h e  job. 
Although it is purpor ted  t h a t  automated sys tems arc easy t o  l e a r p ,  i n  
pract:ce, some of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  have found tha t  t h e  new systems are harder 
t o  l e a r n  than  t h e  o ld  ones.  T h i s  is due i n  p a r t  t o  t h e  f ac t  t h a t  newer FVS- 
terns o f t e n  perform more f u n c t i o n s  and are e;eneral ly  more com2lex than  t h e  syy-  
terns t h e y  r ep lace .  
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The i n t r o d u o t i o n  of autolgetud equipment on t h e  f l igh t  deck also m y  imply 
a need t o  makg a ohange in t h e  p i l o t  seleotien prooess.  It miry be t h a t  the 
a u r r e n t  g i l o t a ,  who am Rood o o n t r o l l e r s ,  w i l l  n o t  make @ monitors.  If' 
t h i s  is the  oase ,  t h e  selection prooedures my need to  be changed i n  t h e  f'u- 
t u r e .  
-m - C u r r e n t l y ,  when new s y s t e m  am developed and tested, it 
is done wlth an e y e  toward the b e n e f i t s  t he  new system w i l l  provide.  The par- 
t i c i p a n t s  fe l t  that too l i t t le  a t t e n t i o n  had been paid t b  the  shortcomings of 
t h e  system. F a i l u r e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  problems u s u a l l y  leads to "band-aidingn t h e  
system rather than  redesimine it, and t h i s  w a s  s e e n  as a problem. For  e x a c  
ple,  t h e r e  has been some d i s c u s s i o n  about d i s p l a y i n g  Air T r a f f i c  C o n t r o l  ( A X )  
c l e a r a n c e s  on a CRT i n  the  oockp i t  rather t h a n  s e n d i w  them o u t  by v o i c e  
t r ansmiss ion .  The proponents  of t h i s  approach p o i n t  o u t  t ha t  t h i s  w i l l  r educe  
p i l o t  errors t h a t  are due t o  misunderstanding t h e  stated a l t i t u d e .  The pro- 
ponents f a i l  t o  p o i n t  o u t ,  however, that  p i lo t s  would then  be s u b J e c t  to read- 
tnE errors, which may or may not occm as f r e q u e n t l y  as h e a r i n g  errors. Pi- 
lo t s  m y  also lose t h e i r  s e n s e  of where o t h e r  aircraft are located, which they 
now deduce from h e a r i n g  c l e a r a n c e s  for a l l  the  aircraft  i n  t h e i r  v i c i n i t y .  
Another example of a design-induced error can be seen  i n  f l i q h t  management 
systems, where i n c o r r e c t  data e n t e r e d  by way of t h e  conso le  can be d t s a s t r o u s .  
I n c i d e n t s  have a l r e a d y  occurred us ing  t h e  i n e r t i a l  n a v i g a t i o n  system (INS), 
w i t h  p i l o t s  e n t e r i n g  i n c o r r e c t  information about  t h e i r  waypotnts. 
Another problem stems f r o m  t h e  fact t h a t  most systems are designed for 
use by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  n o t  by teams. A i r l i n e  p i l o t s  u s u a l l y  f u n c t t o n  as  part of 
a two- or three-person crew and t h e  p a r t i c t p a n t s  fe l t  t h a t  t h i s  should be con- 
s i d e r e d  when systems are designed. 
The p a r t i c i p a n t s  were also concerned w i t h  t h e  manner o f  p r e s e n t i n g  in fo r -  
mation t o  t h e  p i l o t s .  They pointed o u t  t h a t  information must be p resen ted  i n  
a way t h a t  minimizes ambiguity and i n a c c u r a t e  i n t e r p r e t a t t o n  of t h e  informa- 
t i o n  which might lead t u  misdtagnosts  o f  a problem. 
S v s t e r p u  - When an automated system is f u n c t i o n i n g  p r o p e r l y ,  t h e  p i l o t  
w i l l  be re1egate.l  to t h e  role o f  a monitor f o r  t h a t  f u n c t i o n .  It was fe l t  
t h a t  p i l o t s  m i g h t  n o t  f i n d  t h i s  role as cha l l eng ing  a s  t h e i r  c u r r e n t  r o l e  and 
tha t  t h i s  miqht l e a d  t o  boredom or Althoueh boredom and compla- 
cency were not  a c t u a l l y  d e f i n e d ,  these terms might encompass r e a c t i o n s  s u c h  a s  
p i l o t s  t o  "stay ahead of" OF even t o  j u s t  " a t ay  up t o  date" w i t h  t h e  
c u r r e n t  s ta tus  o f  t h e  f l i g h t .  T h i s  could lead to  d i s a s t r o u s  results if t h e  
p i l o t  is forced to  take over t h e  c o n t r o l s  suddenly because o f  an emergencv. 
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  normal Ru8rm=upw time required t o  make t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from 
monttor t o  c o n t r o l l e r ,  there w i l l  be t h e  time required t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  
current s ta tus  o f  t h e  a i r p l a n e  and a s s e s s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
f a i l i n g  
Later in t h e  workshop, t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  were asked t o  put  themselves i n  
t h e  p o s i t i o n  of a research manager who wa3 given t h e  t a s k  of dec id inq  how t o  
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e s t a b l i s h  p r t o r t t l e s  for apendtag  r e s e a r a h  money. They were asked  what wt- 
terta t h e y  m l d  use to  assess a reseraruh program befOre makin& t h t a  deolaton. 
A number of  potential artteria were suggested, but no aonsensus  w a s  m o h e d  as 
to whioh questtons were oruatal. This SUUIIUWY, t hen ,  mfleota suggesttons. 
from individual parttotpants. 
The ftrst arlterton suggested was how tmportant  t h e  answer pravtded by a 
g iven  p i eoe  of researah mtght be t o w  reaah ing  t h e  final goal. Although t h e  
p a r t t o t p a n t s  felt t h a t  t h t s  was a worthy c o n s i d e r a t t o n ,  t h e y  pointed o u t  that  
importance MS n o t  o p e r a t t o n a l l y  def ined  and t h a t  perhaps  t h e  q u e s t i o n  should  
be phrased i n  terms of how long it would take to  get a payoff  f r o m  t h e  
r e sea rch .  They also po in ted  o u t  t h a t  some r e s e a r c h  t h a t  is tmpor tan t  may be 
very  d i f f i c u l t ,  or impossible, t o  c a r r y  out .  In some areas, researchers have 
been unab le  t o  develop  adequate  performance m a s u r e s .  I n  o t h e r  areas, t h e  
problems do n o t  become apparen t  u n t t l  after long-term i n t e r a c t i o n  of p i l o t s  
w i t h  t h e  system, making research on these t y p e s  of prob:cems ve ry  d i f f i c u l t  i n  
a laboratory s e t t i n g .  For example, t h e  loss of f l y i n g  s k i l l  t h a t  can  accom- 
pany t h e  u s e  of more advanced, more automated a i r p l a n e s  d id  n o t  become ap- 
pa ren t  u n t i l  a number of c o - p t l o t s  on these aircraf t  were upgraded and as- 
siqned as c a p t a i n s  t o  less advanced aircraft. 
Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n  is t h e  t iming  involved. The p a r t i c i p a n t s  f e l t  t ha t  
NASA should  address i s s u e s  releted t o  sys t ems  t h a t  are c u r r e n t l y  on t h e  draw- 
i n g  board as well as longer-tt'rm i s sues .  However, t h e r e  was a consensus t h a t  
i f  r e s e a r c h  could  n o t  be completed in a t i m e l y  f a s h i o n ,  there was l i t t l e  pur- 
pose i n  i n i t i a t i n g  it. it 
is impossible t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  research .  
Some q u e s t i o n s  need to  be answered so q u i c k l y  t h a t  
The p a r t i c i p a n t s  a lso sugges ted  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  should  be g iven  t o  t h e  
' ' s t o r y  of t h e  problem; t h a t  is, how big is the problem, how much work h a s  al-  
real:: been done i n  t h i s  area, and do t h e  answers already e x i s t ?  I n  answering 
these q u e s t i o n s ,  it w i l l  be important  t o  assess how d i r e c t l y  t h e  ex i s t ine ;  
research addres ses  t h e  c u r r e n t  problem. For example, there is a c u r r e n t  con- 
t r o v e r s y  over  t h e  mandatory r e t i r emen t  age of 60 for  a i r  c a r r i e r  p i l o t s .  
Although there is a large body of research t h a t  stlows t h e  effect. of aRe on 
v a r i a b l e s  such  as choice r e a c t i o n  time, psychomtor  s k i l l s ,  and c o q n i t i v e  
s k i l l s ,  t h e  ev idence  does no t  d i r e c t l y  address t h e  effect of aRe on t h e  a b i l i -  
t y  t o  f l y  a n  a i r p l a n e .  
L a s t l y ,  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t 3  suggested t h a t  it is impor tan t  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
g o a l s  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  doing t h e  research and whether  the proposed r e s e a r c h  
is directed toward those goals. I n  t h e  con tex t  af t h e  workshop, t h e  p i r t i c i -  
pan t s  sugges ted  t h a t  NASA shou ld  be Involved i n  h igh - r i sk ,  long-term ven tu res  
t h a t  t r y  t o  answer some of t h e  larger q u e s t i o n s  rather than  short-term ven- 
t u r e s  t h a t  answer des ign  ques t ions .  They a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  NASA should be work- 
i n s  toward c r e a t i n g  a "handbook" of q u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r y  and t h a t  t h i s  
handbook should  inc lude  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t h i n g s  t h a t  should n o t  be done as well 
as for t h i n g s  t h a t  shou ld  be done. The p a r t i c i p a n t s  suqqes ted  t h a t  t h i s  hand- 
book miuh t  also c o n t a i n  some sort of " s e n s i t i v i t y  curves"  t o  show how t h e  
a b i l i t y  t o  perform a given  t a sk  decays 83 a funct.ion of t h e  time e lapsed  s i n c e  
t he  task was last  performed. 
These su~ggest ions l e d  t o  a dtsousslon of whether such a handbook would 
aotua l ly  be used and to  the  more general  question o f  how to implement t h e  
f lndings from h u m  f ao to r s  resaamb. A lergg body of human faatore researoh 
bas been produoed over the last 40 years and t h e  participants fe l t  t h a t  the 
systems designers  have not a1WYS Used that  information; however, no oonsmsus 
on how t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h i s  problem was reaohed. 
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SUMHARP OF PARALLEL SESSIONS 
The primary o b j e o t t v e  of t h e  workshop waa t o  develop a list o f  r e s e a r c h  
toptoe on t h e  human faators of f'ltght-beak automatton. I n  t h e  second and 
fourth eesstons of the  workshop, t h e  p a r t i a t p a n t s  were d i v i d e d  i n t o  two 8roups 
of equal size. I n  the seaond session, t h e  groups were formed so t h a t  t he  mix- 
t u r e  of baokground tntereits would bs roughly the same i n  both groups.  Each 
group was W e d  to  g e n e r a t e  a llst of 25 to  30 b r a d  s u b j e o t s  for automation 
research. They were asked t o  ohoose t o p i o s  t h a t  were n o t  so broad as to  pro- 
v i d e  l i t t l e  or no eutdanoe,  bu t  whiah were no t  so s p e c t f t c  t h a t  a s i n q l e  stmu- 
l a t i o n  or a n a l y s i s  would answer t h e  ques t ton .  I n  t he  f o u r t h  s e s s i o n ,  t h e  par- 
t i o i p a n t e  were b iv tded  so that those wi th  a p p l i e d  backgrounds were i n  one 
group, and those vLth basio researah backgrounds were t n  t h e  other group. In  
t h i s  s e s s t o n ,  the p a r t i c i p a n t s  were asked to  g e n e r a t e  more specific research 
q u e s t i o n s  t o  zomDlement t h e  b roade r  q u e s t i o n s  gene ra t ed  d u r i n g  the  prevtous 
sess ton  
The q u e s t i o n s  gene ra t ed  by a l l  of' t h e  groups were compiled i n  a s i n g l e  
list. The q u e s t i o n s  were reworded as necessa ry  t o  avoid ambiguity and redun- 
dancy, and they  were grouped i n t o  six categories: systems q u e s t i o n s ,  implemen- 
t a t i o n ,  methodology, s e l e c t i o n  and t r a i n i n g ,  man-machine i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  and 
f i e l d  s t u d i e s .  T h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  process proved to be d i f f i c u l t  s i n c e  many 
c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s  were possible, and s i n c e  wi th in  any given c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  sys- 
tem, q u e s t i o n s  were often related t o  more than  one ca t egory .  This was espe- 
c i a l l y  t r u e  for the  man-machine-interaction category.  Subcategories reflect- 
i n g  the  human s i d e  of t h e  i n t e r a c t t o n  were used (e.&!., use of Information,  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of In fo rma t ion ) ,  but  e q u a l l y  feasible subcategories describe 
t h e  t a s k  (e.g., cont ro l l . ing ,  monitar ing,  planninrq, decision-making) These 
task-related aspects are inco rpora t ed  in t h e  list al though t h e y  are not 
h tgh l igh ted .  It should also be noted t h a t  t h e  o r d e r  o f  t h e  categories and of 
t h e  q u e s t i o n s  w i t h i n  each category does n o t  reflect t h e  r e l a t i v e  importance of 
t h e  ques t ions .  
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The oomplete list of guestionrs adln be found i n  appendix B. For t h e  pur- 
poses of b r e v i t y ,  o n l y  the  major q u e s t i o n s  under eaoh heading  are inoluded  
here. Quostions under reoond level headings  in seation 5 (5.1, 5.2, eto . 1, 
were deleted for the  sake of olaripp. 
1.1 How oan l e v e l s  of oookpit automation be v a r i e d  t o  make them compatible 
wi th  t h e  ATC system? 
1.2 How can  t h e  b e n e f i t s  and oosts of automation be assessed? 
1.3 What t echn iques  can  be developed for testing sys tem i n t e g r i t y  and immunity 
t o  human error, p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  errors a r i s l n q  from use/misuse of t h e  hardware 
and software? 
2.1 What a t t r i b u t e s  of automation i n f l u e n c e  its aocectabtliky and use? How 
can a t t l t u d e s  toward automation be modified? 
2.2 To what e x t e n t  must i n d i v i d u a l  models of a i rcraf t  be cons idered  i n  makin8 
des ign  recommendations and g u i d e l i n e s ?  
3.1 Can better ways of measuring crew performanee l e v e l s  and crew workload 
l e v e l s  be found? 
3.2 Can e f f i c f e n t  t echn iques  be designed t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  rare f a i l u r e s  i n  man- 
machine systems? 
4.1 What are t h e  implicatims of automation for crew s e l e c t i o n  
criteria/methods? 
4.2 What are t h e  problems associated w i t h  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  ol’ p i l o t s  across a i r -  
c ra f t  t y p e s  and d i f f e r e n t  g e n e r a t i o n s  of automated equipment? 
4.3 How does automation affect  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  and r e t e n t i o n  of psychomotor 
and c o g n i t i v e  s k i l l s ?  
4.4 To what e x t e n t  Is on-board t r a i n i n g  feasible and b e n e f i c i a l ?  
4.5 W i l l  o lder  or  h i g h l y  exper ienced  p t l o t s  be able t o  adap t  r e a d i l y  t o  ad- 
vanced equipment? If n o t ,  what procedures  can be developed t o  l e s s e n  t h e  
problem? 
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5.1 . 1 How ahould dealaion-aiding and deoiaion-making teohniques be umd? 
5.1.2 How aan data transfer between the  devioe and the  crew be improved by ef- 
feotive system8 destgn? 
5.2.1 How muoh systems tnformatton ahould t h e  operator be given? 
5.2.2 How should information given to  t h e  operator be represented7 
5.3.1 Uhat features of ta6ks make them easy or diffioult? 
5.4.1 What are t h e  advantages and disadvantages of t h e  human monitoring t h e  
automatla system, rather than actively oontrolltng it? 
5.4.2 What can be done to  improve the  performance of the human :sting as a 
monitor, particularly i n  h i s  failure-deteotinq/correcting ab i l i t -  : 
5.4.3 How w i l l  t h e  automatic system and the operators deal w i t h  unforeseen and 
unplanned circumstanoes? 
5.5.1 Are there negattve psychosocial consequences of automation? 
5.5.2 To what extent does increased automation lead to boredoe and complacen- 
CY? 
5.6.1 How should operational procedures for highly automated aircraf t  be 
designed? What callouts should be made? By whom? How and when should check- 
lists be used? 
5.6.2 How does automation influence the choice of crew size and the role that 
each crew member plays? 
5.6.3 Apart from crew size,  how does automation affect the organtzatton and 
operation of the crew as a team? 
6.1 Develop a data base, a data base system, and a data collection system for 
doing research on operational history and operating axperience w i t h  automated 
systems. Use t h i s  data base to  identify today's c r i t i ca l  problems. 
6.2 Use case studies of past commercial a i rcraf t  and appropriate mi l i ta ry  a i r -  
craft  to examine past automation decisions. 
6.3 Conduct a user survey to  determine attitudes toward t h e  use 
available automation. 
of currently 
6.4 Perform an observational s t u d y  t o  dete-mine actual use patterns for au- 
tomated equipment. 
6.5 Conduct, a r i s k  assessment survey of t h e  use, nonuse, o f  misuse of automat- 
ed features of aircraf t  t o  identify the current problems. 
There -8 no forrnal d e f i n i t t o n  of t h e  term %wtomationw proposed at the  
workshop, bd t  the owrating d e f t n i t i o n  seeleed to  be the a l l o o a t f o n  of tasks (a 
task perfornted by a a a c h i n e  was considered t o  be automated even i f  both t h e  
hurean and t h e  machine were perfmtng the same task i n  parallel). This deffn-  
i t i o n  i ed  to  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of q u e s t i o n s  i n  many d i s c i p l i n e s ,  e.q., t r a i n -  
ing,  equipment design, i n t e r a c t i v e  systems,  planntnq,  and d e c i s i o n  making. 
Mot s u r w i s i n g l y ,  the  m a j o r i t y  of research topics produced by the  
workshop (about  75s) concerned Man-Machlne I n t e r a c t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  impact of 
automation i n  other areas m a  n o t  overlooked. We asked t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  
while rewiewing a draf i  of t h i s  report, t o  rate the  major research areas (pp- 
10-11) i n  term8 of the  importance and urgency of the  in fo rma t ion  i n  t h a t  par- 
t i c u l a r  area. Th,s was n o t  an easy task,  p r i m a r i l y  because of t h e  wide 
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s p e c i f i c i t y  of t h e  topics. The compt l a t ion  of t h e  r a t i n g s  
showed a consensus that  t h e  most important /urgent  topics were 1.3 (What tech- 
n iques  can be developed f o r  testing system i n t e g r i t y  and l m u n i t y  t o  huraan er- 
ror.-.) and 5.4.3 (How w i l l  t h e  au tomat i c  system and the  o p e r a t o r  deal wi th  
unforseen and unplanned circumstances?) .  The least important /urqent  t o p i c s ,  
according to  t h e  ratings, were 5.5.1 (Are there n e g a t i v e  psychosocial conse- 
quences of a u t o s a t t o n ? )  and 2.2 (To what e x t e n t  must i n d i v i d u a l  medels of air- 
craft  be considered i n  making des iqn  recommendations and g u i d e l i n e s ? )  
Although t h e  list of resezrch issues gene ra t ed  i n  t h e  workshop is a broad 
w e  r ecogn ize  t h a t  some topics of i n t e r e s t  may not have been covered and one, 
i n v i t e  sugges t ions  for a d d t t i o n a l  t o p i c s  to  be Included. 
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1.1 How o m  level0 of  oookptt automatton be oarId to m i h h  thwm aeapstiblo 
with the A X  avatm? 
1.3 What taahntquea O(UL be doveloped for terttng system Intrgrttp and trplwnity 
to hupur or=, (nrrttculrrlp to eppops arising f’rom u s e h b w ~ ~  o f  the krdmrs, 
and aoftuare? 
2.1 What attrtbutes o f  autoeation Influenue it8 acoaptabiltty urd use? H o u  
can attitudes toward automation be modtftsd? 
2.2 To what extent must tndtvtdual models of aircraft be constdored In  m k i q  
desiqn ncoseendetions and guidelines? 
3.1 Can better way8 o f  wasurtng Crew performance levels 8nd crew Workldad 
level3 be found? 
3.1.1 What are the ways t ~ .  whtch the flight crew lpteht be rsststed t o  
deterartne thetr own mrkload level l n  order to smooth out the penks and 
trougha whtch are now coamon? 
3.2 Can efftctent techntques be destmed to investigate rare failures in wan- 
mchtne systems; 
4.1  What are the tapllcattons of automatton for crew selectton 
crtterta/methods? 
8.3.1 Sow qutoklg do menual and oogntttve akUl8 detertamrte wtth laak o f  
we0 Yhat f’aotora le?lueaoe tbe rate of loss? 
4 3.2 Wbet r’aotocs lead to an tncmase in tbe retenttoo of tnfhquently 
used 8ktllat 
8.3.4 Vhat 1s the  effect of system eocsplextty on crew t r a i n t o g  and the re- 
t e n t t o n  of training? 
4.9 To what extent Is on-board t r a i n i n g  !kasIble and b e n e f l c t a l ?  
4.4.1 Can computer-aided k ! a n I n g / i e s t r r r c t t o n  (CALI11 be used for spectftc 
on-board t r a t n t n g ,  e.g., emergency procedures? 
4.4.2 W l l  on-board t r s t n t n q  help I n  ma tn ta In tn3  p r o f i c i e n c y  and a b t l t t y  t o  
hand le  sudden and *mexp@cted crltical even t s?  
4.4.3 Does on-board t r a i n i n g  entail any Plsks? 
4.5 Y t l l  older or h i g h l y  enperlenced p i lo t s  be able t o  adap t  r e a d l l y  t o  ad- 
vanced equt-nt? If n o t ,  w h a t  procedures  can be developed to  l e s s e n  th8 
problem? 
5.1.1 How shou ld  d e c i s i o n - a l d l n u  and dectston-amking t echn iques  be used? 
S.l.l.1 Does thts technology cause t h e  p l l o t  t o  be more deteched from 
his a l r c r a f t  and t h e  real world? If so, what are t h e  consequences of 
t h i s ?  
5.1.1.2 To what e x t e n t  shou ld  s t r a t e g l c  planning (routes, c l e a r a n c e s ,  
etc.) be handled an the  f l i g h t  deck r a t h e r  than on t h e  ground? 
5.1.1.3 Can t h t s  technology be used t o  a l low for I n - f l t q h t  a l t e r n a t e  
plannlng? 
5.1.1.4 Can nutomatton be wed to mke oautton and o l e r t h q  systslns w e  
wmprehenstble, and pcrrhpa @ t n t e l l t m t * ?  Haw o m  these.systems be 
evaluated? 
5.1.1.5 When will the pilot aeoept the concluslm of the "mart" system 
and when w i l l  this conahaston be questioned and challenmd? 
5 . t . l . 6  Yhat are t h e  charrctertsttcs ot 4n Ideal (but rttrtnable) alsrt- 
Inu and varn€nu system? 
5.1.1.6.1 What arc the w s t  effecttve kinds qnd anoilnts of Eiaqnostis? 
infomatton the pilot can use in the ttlfte he has available? 
5.1.1.6.2 Can the format of d?aaaosttc infomation be adapted as a 
furletton of how the pilot seeks infomatian abaut t h e  sytten? 
5.1.1.7 khat events lead to 3 grwral nr permanent distrust of autoa?ted 
de* ices? 
5.1.1.8 When a decision atdins device presents the user w i t h  a dm?ision, 
how mucA information should the user be eiven about t h e  factors which 
have and have no& been considered i n  nakinq  t h e  Raciston? 
5.1.2 HQW can d a t a  transfer between the d e v i c e  and t h e  crew be Lsnroved by 
effective systems destcr.? 
5.1.2.1 Should system languaqes be written to m t c 9  the *aar?tal n1o4?lw 
of the pllot? 
5.1.2.2 How can data bases be constructed and acceased t s  a ~ s ~ r c -  
convenience to the crew, and their full utilization? 
spec-?, 
5.1.2.: How should op-board disp lays  be d e s i q n e d  and used to reJricr. t ! w  
shcrt-tern and lony-term aemory load? 
5.1.2.1; h 5 a t  are the Piunificant variables influencinq decisions t - t i w  
various input .?evicts: multimode keyboards, dedicated l.'cv!m,?rd~. t i ~ t l  
voice-actustei? controls? 
5.2.1 How much system information should the operator be civen? 
5.2.1.1 What effect does the amcunt. of knvwledqe abogt thc .qv:~tn- h r w  
on sy-stem perforwince (normal and fitlure m d c s ) ?  
5.2.1.? Should system inteRrlty information be avallablt t,o t h e  f l  t,-ht. 
crew a t  all times? 
5.2.1.9 b a t  tr tlw role o f  ttme-baaetd Infomattan (Matortoel or 
gmdtottvcp) la automated ayst-3 
5.2.1.0.1 tSow Ban "'the tim dtmmston@ ( h t r t o r t o a l  and p r e d t o t t v e  tn- 
fosarrtian) best be r e p m a e n t e d  on t h e  ptlot's Uirsplap? 
5.2.1.4.2 What l a  t h e  effwt on p l l o t  perf'ormanoe of p rov td tng  a 
p r o d t o t o r  d i s p l a y  of v a r i o u s  atreraft mramstera, auuh as atrspeed, 
a l t t t u d e ,  and p o s i t t o n ?  
5.2.1.4.3 Wtll t h e  e f f i o t e m y  of a prediator dev ioe  deoay over .ttme 
and beeoms d e t r t a e n t a l  If It prediots too fpp ahead? 1;f so, is t h e  
dsoay Funatton for aural and v i s u a l  modes d i f f e r e n t ?  
5.3.2 ?iow should t n f o m t i o n  gtvm to  t h e  operator be r e p r e s e n t e d ?  
5.2.2.1 How can ln fo rma t ton  be ooded to show Its acioursoy and re l iab i l i -  
t Y ?  
5.2.2.2 If the  au tomat i c  d e v i c e  1s chanstng the  system c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  
should it make t h e  change a u t o m a t i e a l l y  and inform the operator, or make 
t h e  o h w e  only after operator aoknowledgra4nt? Should it tell the 
operator why it t s  making the change? 
5.2.2.3 mat are the  r e l a t i v e  merits of v i s u a l  v e r s u s  a u d i t o r y  communi- 
oattoo for atr-ground d ia logues?  
5.2.2.3.1 Is it important  t h a t  t h e  mental image of t h e  surrounding 
traffic, dovelopod by a u d i t o r y  cols#aunicatlon, wight be destroyed when 
t h e  v i s u a l  d i s p l a y  of A X  communication is used? 
5.2.2.4 Haw can pilots '  mental  models of system9 be determined? A r e  the 
mental models of d i f f e r e n t  p i l o t s  s u f f i c t e n t l y  s i m i l a r  for it to  be 
feasible t o  complement t h e i r  mental models i n  d i s p l a y  p r e s e n t a t i o n s ?  
5.2.2.5 Can autoraation improve t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which on-board a i r c r a f t  
system can be temporarily modified, or altered, to  better accommodate 
i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  among crews and/or  cretJ members? 
5.2.2.6 When should the! information c o n t e n t  o f  d i s p l a y s  be c o n t r o l l e d  
automatically and when should it be c o n t r o l l e d  manually? 
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5.3.1 What feature3 ot t a s k s  make thew easy or d i f f i o u l t ?  
5.3.1.1 What features mke tasks e a s y  or d i f f i c u l t  t o  time-share? 
5.3.1.2 What f e a t u r e s  mke t a s k s  sensitive t o  i n t e r r u p t i o n s 3  
5.4.1 What are t h e  advantages  and d i s a d v a n t a s e s  of t h e  human moni tor inq  t h e  
au tomat i c  system, rather t h a n  a c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l l i n q  €t? 
5.4.1.1 How should  t h e  o p e r a t o r  perform as svs tems dertrade? How w i l l  
t h e  system communicate its fallure t o  t h e  o p s r a t o r ?  
5.4.1.1.1 Can a d i a g n o s t i c  computer be used to  te l l  t h e  o p e r a t o r  t h e  
degree t o  which h e  nua t  assume a c t i v e  p a r t € c i p a t i o n  i n  c o n t r o l ,  in- 
creased moni tor ing ,  or f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of aroblems? 
5.4.1.1.2 Given tha t  a system f a € l u r e  does n o t  i nvo lve  a loss of 
f u n c t i o n  or have immediate d e t r i m e n t a l  consequences,  what in for fna t fon  
abcu t  t h e  f a i l u r e ,  i f  any, should  t h e  p i l o t  be q iven?  
5.4.1.2 How w i l l  t h e  sys tem become aware of and des1 w i t h  human f a i l u r e ?  
5.4.1.2.1 What are t h e  problems associated w i t h  f l i c h t  crew d a t a  en- 
t r y  errors I n  p r e s e n t  (e.g., INS and ACARS) and planned (e.:., P-767) 
cockp i t  man-computer i n t e r f a c e s ?  
5.4.1.3 What are t h e  advantaqes  and d i sadvan taqes  of t h e  p r i o r i t i z a t i o n  
of alarms? 
5.4.1,4 Can f u n c t i o n a l  tasks  and d i s p l a y s  be devised  t h a t  w i l l  k e e p  t h e  
aircrew member Itin t h e  loopn? Is t h i s  always desirable? 
5.4.2 What can be done t o  improve t h e  performance of t h e  human w t t n a  a9 
monitor ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in h i s  failure-detecttne/correct€nc a b i l i t y ?  
a 
5.4.2.1 Is there a "warm-up" de lay  when he  t r a n s i t i o n s  from Das.siva -on- 
l t o r  t o  a c t i v e  c o n t r o l l e r  i n  t h e  event  of a f R t l u r e ?  I f  so, can t . h i s  be 
prevented by system d e s i a n ?  
5.4.2.2 How can moni tor in3  of t h e  other  crew members' f u n c t i o n s  be pcr- 
fermed i n  o t h e r  than  a random manner? Can o r  should  it be Tore syytems- 
t i z c d  as i.s supposedly done durinq f i n a l  anwoach?  
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5.4.2.4 Does automation lull the monitor into stater of low alertnew 
when he Is primarily a monitor? Can the operator-monitor be easlly dis- 
traoted fro10 hir monitoring ta8k by unimportant stimuli (e.g.* oasual 
oonveraat ion) ? 
5.4.2.5 What are the behavioral and performanoe differenoes between sim- 
ple urd aomplex monitoring tasks? 
5.4.2,6 What means are available (or oould be developed) for mintaining 
a monitor's alertness? Artifioial signals? Will additional workload 
help or h a m  primary monitorlng task perf'ormanoe? 
5.4.3 How wiZl the automatio system and the operators deal with unforeseen 
and unplanned circumstanoes? 
5.8.3.1 When these occur suddenly, and the h w n  must assume wntrol, 
how can a smooth transition take place? How will it be determined that 
a transition is necessary? What are the human limitations in dealing 
with these problems? 
5.4.3.1.1 Is the ability to make a smooth transition conditionable or 
trainable? If so, how? 
5.4.3.1.2 How is pilot reaction time and correctness of response af- 
fected by early warnlnu of impending reversion to another operational 
mode? 
5.4.3.1.3 To what dearee can procedural precautions minimize pilot 
reaction time and enhance the probability of correct initial input? 
5.4.3.1.4 What role does startle threshold/reaction play? 
5.4.3.1.5 Under what conditions should flight control systems fail 
active, passive, or safe? 
5.4.3.1.6 To what degree can initial and recurrent training 
the undesirable effects of such revers€ons? 
minimize 
5.4.3.1.7 What effect wlll tratning have on user confidence and 
willingness to use, the automated equipment? (worst case/tlme train- 
ing? ) 
in, 
5.5.1 Are there negative psychosocial consequences of automation? 
5.5.1.1 If so, what preoauttona and/or remedies w t l l  be effeotive? 
5.5.1.2 How w i l l  automation influence Job sat isfact ion,  prestiqs,  and 
sel f-aonoept? 
5.5.2 To what extent does increased automation lead t o  boredom and compla- 
cency? 
5.5.2.1 What causes boredom? 
5.5.2.2 Can people be tratned t o  cope w i t h  boredom? 
5.5.2.3 What k ind  of nonproducttve oh* hazardous behavior is apt t o  
resul t  from boredom? 
5.5.2.4 Are individual differences i n  boredom and complacency operation- 
a l l y  important? How are  these differences measured? 
5.5.2.5 Can t echn iques ,  methods, or systems be destgned t o  reduce or el-  
iminate boredom and complacency? 
5.5.2.5.1 Can vieilance be  improved by f i l l i n g  periods of inact ivi ty  
w i t h  other a c t i v i t i e s  ( e . g . ,  computer games, advance planninw,  re- 
fresher training)? 
5.6.1 How should operatioaal procedures for h h h l y  auto-ated a i rc raf t  be 
designed? What callouts should be made? Ry whom? How and when should 
checklists be used? 
5.6.2 How does automation influence t h e  choice of crew s ize  and the role 
that each crew member plays? 
5.6.2.1 How does automation a f fec t  the role  of a p i lo t  i n  a one-verso3 
crew, such as i n  commuter a i r l ines?  
5.6.3 Apart from crew size,  how does automation affect  the orqanimtion and  
operation of the crew as a team? 
6.1  Develop a data base, a data base system, and a data collection system f o r  
doin? research on operational history and operatin4 experience w i t h  eutonqted 
system. Use t h i s  data base t o  identifv today's c r i t i c a l  n r o h l e m .  
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6.2 Uae oase r tudlen  of past oemwoial alroraf't and appmpr la t e  aallitary ab- 
oraft t o  examine past automatlon doolrions. 
6.2.1 Compam oollmsraial and a i l t t a r y  deaim deoirlonr. 
6.2.2 Retmapeat ively,  was the  dec i r lon  t o  automate a f'unotion such as au- 
toland a wise one? Why? 
6.2.3 Whrt was r u t  and what waa wrong with the tmplementatioa and Intra- 
duetlon of  the automated systems? 
6.3 Conduot a use r  survey to determine a t t i t u d e 8  toward the ma8 o f  ourren t ly  
ava i l ab le  automation. 
6.4 Perfom an observat ional  study t o  determlne ao tua l  use pa t t e rns  for au- 
tomated equipment. 
6.5 Conduot a risk assessment survey of t h e  use, nonuse, or misuse of automat- 
ed fea tures  of a i r o r a f t  to  iden t i fy  the  durrent  problems. 
